This is an article I wrote for the American College of Emergency Physicians (ACEP) Tactical newsletter:
"Red Hat Guy"
Mike Simpson
Prior to attending medical school, I had a 17-year military career, with all of that time spent as an operator in USSOCOM units including Ranger Regiment and Special Forces. When I became a senior NCO I attended the Operations and Intelligence course, which was designed to teach me all of the skills necessary to perform Intelligence Preparation of The Battlefield (IPB). In other words, the O&I course taught me how to progress from being a shooter to being an expert in military intelligence, and understanding how to see the battle space through the eyes of my enemy. When I returned to my Special Forces team, one of my new additional duties was to act as what we referred to as the "Red Hat Guy".
The "Red Hat Guy", has the sole responsibility of analyzing the team's tactical plan from the enemy's point of view, and assessing for every possible flaw that could be exploited. This analysis goes into each and every phase of the plan from training and movement in a secured area, up to extraction from the final objective and the team's return to home station. During planning, as the team outlines the battle plan, the "Red Hat Guy" counters with every conceivable weakness and outlines exactly how enemy elements will react to the team's actions.
Like much of my training, this mindset has stayed with me throughout the course of my life. As a physician, I look at each potential treatment and intervention from the point of view of the pathology that I am working against. In my personal life, I look at each situation in my daily life from the point of view of those who could possibly seek to do harm to me or to my family. Whether it is my social media presence, my home security system, or my daily pattern of life to include my everyday carry and the routes I drive to and from work, I make a solid attempt to look for the holes in my personal security and make changes when appropriate.
When I retired from the military, and was invited into the Civilian Tactical Medicine community, one of the very first things I noticed was a lack of "Red Hat" analysis in planning, policy, and execution.
Probably the most glaring example of this deficit is a severe lack of Operational Security (OPSEC). Whereas the military goes to great lengths to protect details surrounding how operations will be carried out, Civilian TEMS operational details can be readily found in publications and in news stories. A quick google search will yield a treasure trove of valuable intelligence as it relates to TEMS and RTF implementation. Additionally, agencies often share details of their standard operating procedures (SOPs) and "lessons learned" in publicly available after-action reports and via email. Unfortunately, very few of these agencies are using secure email servers or vetting all recipients in email strings/chains prior to sharing information of an operational nature. While it is perfectly understandable that agencies would want to share knowledge, it is naive to think that this open source information cannot ultimately be used against first responders by bad actors.
When it comes to training, very few agencies have had the foresight to utilize a "Red Hat" in their planning. In order to adequately pressure test a plan for every conceivable flaw, it is imperative to exploit weaknesses in training. One could even go so far as to say that catastrophic mission failure during training exercises is desirable, as it exposes mission critical flaws in a safe environment. Bruised egos and the necessity of spending more time and effort in the development and implementation of a new battle plan are small prices to pay if it means saving lives in the long run. Too often, training is performed in a vacuum, with all variables controlled, and with a goal of 100% mission success in each training evolution. This is an extremely flawed approach to readiness.
Often time in training, the only "enemy" is whatever the chain of command designates, and it often ends up being little more than a paper tiger. Whether it is due lack of funds, lack of time, or institutional laziness, the Opposing Force (OPFOR) in training exercises often does little more than act as a rubber stamp of validation on planning and training. This is a potentially deadly mistake. In an age when the scope of domestic terrorism is far reaching, it is incumbent upon every agency to be aware of dynamic and asymmetric threats, and also the attractiveness of first responder assets as targets for both strategic and psychological purposes. When you plan in a vacuum, you plan to fail. As Sun Tzu said, when referring to the success of combat planning, "The enemy gets to vote on the outcome".
So, the question is, how should this be addressed?
At the most basic level, every agency needs to have a "Red Hat Guy". This should not be someone who had a hand in writing any of the agency's current policies. Ideally, it should be someone with an in-depth operational background, as well as training in counter-terrorism, intelligence, and counter-intelligence. The choice on whether to hire from outside or train from within is one that each agency will have to make on its own. However, I can tell you that, as the War on Terror winds down, there are several USSOCOM Operators out there who are retiring with these skills and looking for somewhere to put them to use. Many would prefer to help out their local agencies as opposed to doing lucrative contract work overseas.
Systemically, we need to be aware that every news story, every journal article (Including this one), every AAR and every individual interview in the hometown newspaper goes into the intelligence database of every potential domestic terrorist with even a minimal knowledge of tradecraft. I recognize that transparency and good public relations are important, but they should not supersede OPSEC. Solid efforts must be made to safeguard the tactics, techniques, and procedures that agencies will utilize in real world tactical situations.
With new threats manifesting themselves every day, it is inevitable that the challenges facing in the TEMS community in the future will be even more dynamic and will require innovative solutions. It is incumbent upon the thought leaders in the community to plan accordingly. And, most importantly, to treat this like what it truly is: a war.